Anti-IRV Videos and Literature

[This section added 2019-03-06 UTC.]

Ranking systems destroy important information. Consider for example if a voter would rate Nader 1, Gore .99, Bush 0; vs. another voter who would rate Nader 1, Gore .01, Bush 0. These sets of ratings would yield the same ranking Nader > Gore > Bush. So collecting rankings from the voters instead of ratings throws away vastly different evaluations of Gore in this example.

The paragraph above compares the information collected by fine-grained rating to that collected by ranking. In disputes about the relative merits of ranking vs. Approval Voting, which is a coarse-grained rating system, some interlocutors argue that Approval doesn’t do better than ranking systems in collecting the kind of information I illustrate above, on the grounds that the voter can only fully approve or fully disapprove Gore, and thus can’t express partial approval as I allude to above with the numbers .99 and .01. However, these interlocutors miss the fact that voters faced with coarse rating can use probability to express fractional approval. For example, to give Gore .99 fraction of approval, the voter can consult a random process (e. g. using coins, cards, or a computer) and vote Gore 1 with .99 probability and Gore 0 with .01 probability. If many voters do that, the result is the same as fine-grained rating would have given.

I admit that fine-grained rating is easier to explain to Joe Sixpack than probabilistic methods, and that is a reason to advocate for finer-grained rating than Approval. However I also suggest that in the long run, parties and people if faced with Approval will learn to use it to their advantage by using probability. My ground for this expectation comes from observing that faced with FPtP, people and parties have learned the strategy of discouraging people to run when it appears those people could become “spoilers”. Society has had centuries of experience with FPtP. I suspect that people without any experience with it and faced for the first time with its description, might well fail to predict a “spoiler” phenomenon. But with experience, they have learned. So I predict that faced with Approval, they would learn. So I would be overjoyed if Approval were approved for all single-winner elections in the US. But for maybe a little further improvement over Approval, because faster to learn how to use, I’m suggesting Score{0, .01, .1, .5, .9, .99, 1} or {0, .01, .99, 1}. I suggest that this last would be practical to count by sorting into piles by hand and counting the piles with non-hackable counting machines.

[End of 2019-03-06 UTC addition.]

IRV advocates, do you want other localities to repeat the experience of Burlington, Vt.? They tried IRV and then repealed it and went back to FPtP. I fear that bad experience with IRV will turn people off to much-needed real reform.

Favorite Betrayal in Plurality and Instant Runoff Voting
(which entails spoiler in IRV)

Spoiler effect in IRV

SJVoter again!
“Instant Runoff Voting – Every Vote Counts!” (but the outcome isn’t for the best)

Favorite betrayal and other critiques of IRV

Refutations of false or misleading claims by Howard Dean about Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), by Warren D. Smith

refutation of Cobb / Green-party pro-IRV video, by Warren D. Smith:


A way to cite this compilation:

Instant Runoff Voting (now deceptively referred to as “Ranked-choice Voting”) is not all it’s cracked up to be. Choose Score Voting instead.

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